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significata of its concrete counterpart, which signifies the forms of those 
things which fall under it. But forms for Aquinas, even if they of course can 
be conceived and thus signified in an abstract, universal manner, are nothing 
but the individualized determination of some particular act of real being, 
and this is precisely why they are the principle of being and action in any 
sort of agency. 
4. Just to take one more example, from the chapter on appetite and 
will, consider Kenny's self-assured judgment that Aquinas's natural teleolo-
gy "is something which must be discarded if we are to make any use of his 
philosophy at the present time", on the hopefully "intuitively clear" basis 
that while the growth of a plant is teleological, the falling of a stone is not. 
(p. 61.) To be sure, Kenny deserves credit here for not assuming the other-
wise perhaps also "intuitively clear", but in Aquinas's Aristotelian frame-
work totally false and unjustified claim that all teleological activities must be 
conscious. On the other hand, he never even tries to consider how Aquinas 
may have held that even the falling of a stone is teleological. To that end, 
however, Kenny would have had to give a comprehensive account of 
Aquinas's theory of causation in the overall context of his Aristotelian natur-
al philosophy, which is again radically different from modern conceptions 
of causation. But since Kenny fails to do so, his account is misleading also in 
the subsequent chapter, where he simply classifies Aquinas as a "soft deter-
minist", as if the contemporary classification could be applied to Aquinas's 
theories without any further ado, despite the radical differences between 
Aquinas's and the contemporary concept of 'cause'. (pp. 77-78.) 
5. STl q. 2, a. 1; in Phys lb. 1, le. 1; in De Hebd.le. 1. 
The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. Pp. 384. $45.00 (cloth), 
$22.50 (paper). 
KEVIN MEEKER, University of Notre Dame 
This important anthology offers not only some significant new state-
ments of and attacks on arguments that purport to provide strong, but 
not conclusive, evidence for atheism based on evil but also a fairly com-
prehensive bibliography on the subject. In what follows I will summa-
rize some main themes of each essay and briefly reflect on a few central 
issues in the debate. 
The first two chapters formulate the most potent versions of the evi-
dential challenge to theism. Chapter One reprints William Rowe's "The 
Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". Assuming that God 
would only allow evil that was (logically) necessary for a greater good, 
Rowe argues roughly that atheism is reasonable because it is likely that 
there are some instances of suffering that are not necessary for any 
greater good. In other words, because it seems that God (if such a being 
existed) could have thwarted the occurrence of certain instances of suf-
fering without forfeiting any greater good (or at least we see no reason 
why God could not have done so), atheism is rationally justified. The 
second chapter reproduces Paul Draper's "Pain and Pleasure: An 
Evidential Problem for Theists". Draper contends that theism fares 
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poorly when compared to rival hypotheses in explaining the biological 
function of pain and pleasure. According to Draper if God created the 
universe it is quite surprising that pain (an intrinsic evil) would con-
tribute to the biological goals of human organisms because God could 
presumably create organisms that did not require pain to accomplish 
their goals. That is, the biological role of pain is much more surprising 
given theism than an alternative hypothesis that denies that God-or 
any other nonhuman person-created the universe (this alternative 
Draper calls "the Hypothesis of Indifference" (Hl)). 
Some previously published responses to such arguments comprise 
Chapters Five, Six, and Eight. Chapter Five reprints Alvin Plantinga's 
"Epistemic Probability and Evil". Taking aim at Rowe-like arguments, 
he argues that we are unable to say how probable it is that we would be 
able to discern God's reasons for allowing evil. Hence, it is not clear that 
theism is improbable given the evil in this world; and this is true no mat-
ter what technical conception of probability one employs. Moreover, 
Plantinga contends that even if the proposition <God exists> is improba-
ble on some proposition describing the evils in this world, a person can 
still rationally maintain that God exists if she has other nonpropositional 
evidence for theism. 
The sixth chapter contains William Alston's "The Inductive 
Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition", which is an 
extended defense of the claim that, given our limited cognitive capabili-
ties, we cannot justifiably judge that a particular instance of evil is such 
that God would not forego a greater good by preventing it. To under-
score our limitations, Alston points to, among other things, our lack of 
data (concerning the after-life, the structure of the universe, and so on), 
our difficulties in gaining any reliable information about complex meta-
physical necessities or possibilities, our ignorance of what goods may be 
beyond our grasp, and the complexities involved in making judgments 
of the type that Rowe's argument demands. 
Chapter Eight reprints Peter van Inwagen's "The Problem of Evil, the 
Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence". In attacking Draper-like 
explanatory arguments, van Inwagen cooks up a story that for all we 
know is true and, if true, would show that there is no morally preferable 
possible world that God could actualize that would avoid the suffering 
patterns of this world. Recognizing that some will find his story unpalat-
able, he sprinkles in a generous dose of "modal skepticism" and con-
tends that we are incapable of forming justified beliefs about the truth of 
his story; vanlnwagen then reasons that theists can rightfully resist the 
conclusion that theism is a weak explanatory hypothesis because we 
have no idea how to evaluate the theistic "explanation". Moreover, he 
attempts to augment the plausibility of this strategy by showing how it 
works in other contexts such as (i) a Greek atomist defending his beliefs 
against" Aristotelian" objections about the behavior of air and (ii) some-
one who believes that there is life elsewhere in the universe defending 
her belief despite all our failures to contact such life. 
In the seventh chapter ("Rowe's Noseeum Arguments from Evil") 
Wykstra maintains that we can defeat Rowe's argument if we have some 
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reason to believe that certain God-purposed goods lie beyond our grasp 
(if such goods exist at all). To show that we have some such reason, he 
employs an analogical argument comparing the child/parent relation-
ship to our relationship to God. He points out that the more intelligent, 
powerful, and benevolent the parents, the more likely it is that their chil-
dren will be treated with an eye towards their future well-being even if 
the children cannot presently understand this. Likewise, then, if God 
were governing this world, then we would have some reason to suspect 
that our sufferings serve some future, unseen good. 
A fresh round of atheistic rejoinders kicks off with Paul Draper's "The 
Skeptical Theist" (Chapter Nine) and continues with Bruce Russell's 
"Defenseless" (Chapter Ten), Richard M. Gale's "Some Difficulties in 
Theistic Treatments of Evil" (Chapter Eleven), and William Rowe's "The 
Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look" (Chapter Fourteen). 
Draper attacks Alston and van Inwagen's arguments from Chapters Six 
and Eight. Alston, he claims, simply overlooks explanatory arguments 
from evil and thus hastily concludes from his considerations of our cog-
nitive limitations in the context of Rowe-like arguments that all induc-
tive-type arguments from evil falter. But Draper admits that van 
Inwagen's strategy would undermine his explanatory argument if the 
"defensive" story spun meets certain requirements. Drawing on exam-
ples from other contexts, Draper formulates some necessary conditions 
for a "good" defense and argues that van Inwagen's fails to meet at least 
one of them. Specifically, Draper claims that a parallel "story" that there 
are morally preferable worlds that God could have actualized lacking 
the patterns of suffering in this world defeats van lnwagen's story 
because it is just as "plausible" and it significantly lowers the probability 
that pain and pleasure would be distributed as they are if God exists. 
Russell tries to support different types of evidential arguments. First, 
he defends arguments that appeal to apparently pointless evils by argu-
ing that after the proponent of the argument has conducted a sincere but 
unsuccessful "search" for some reason that would justify God in permit-
ting an instance of evil, she is justified in believing that there is no such 
reason and hence justified in her atheistic conclusion. Next, he defends 
abductive arguments that start with certain patterns or instances of suf-
fering against van Inwagen and Alston's assaults. "Van Inwagen", he 
claims, "has no adequate response to someone who says that, if God 
exists, he would be obliged to reduce to some extent the level of terrible 
suffering that exists in the actual world" (p. 201). Alston, on the other 
hand, unrealistically dictates that one would have to examine all cases of 
suffering before one could justifiably believe that no outweighing good 
would be forfeited if God prevented a particular instance of suffering. 
Gale contends, among other things, that Alston, Plantinga, and van 
lnwagen's strategies make any desirable communion with God impossi-
ble, cheapen religious life and lead to an "across-the-board skepticism" 
(p. 208). Despite containing what are, by his own admission, "potshots" 
at his opponents' positions, his discussion is quite entertaining. Here is 
one brief highlight: 
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I [once] tried to resolve my modal disagreements with the likes of 
van lnwagen and Phil Quinn through my modal intuition bowl, 
but it proved to be a bust. The networks dropped us because there 
wasn't enough violence, just a bunch of ... guys ... staring at each 
other and emphatically asserting back and forth, "It is possible that 
p,""No it isn't!" [Perhaps the ratings would have been higher if the 
networks could have packaged it as a real-life version of Monty 
Python's "The Argument".] (p. 213). 
Unfortunately, given Gale's enjoyable levity, his "potshot" proclivities, 
and his stated aim of attempting to fl ••• keep the fire of controversy 
burning brightly, hopefully as an aid to some student who is faced with 
the challenge of having to write a paper based on the views expressed in 
some of the chapters in this volume" (p. 207), it is difficult to know how 
seriously to take his comments. 
Chapter Fourteen is William Rowe's latest attempt to simplify his 
argument that led off this volume. Instead of arguing inductively from 
the premise that 
(1) no good we know of justifies God in allowing certain instances of 
evil 
to the conclusion that 
(2) in fact no good justifies God in allowing these particular evils 
(from which he can deductively argue for atheism), with the help of 
Bayes' Theorem he now wants to bypass (2) altogether and argue that 
atheism is probable on (1). To defend this reasoning, Rowe addresses 
some issues raised by Wykstra and Alston. According to Rowe if we 
take Wykstra's analogy seriously, then we should expect that God, like a 
good parent, would try to comfort us when we suffer. Because many 
sufferers do not experience God's calming presence, Wykstra's analogy 
fails and thus we lack any reason to expect that goods that justify God in 
allowing suffering are likely to be beyond our grasp. The inference from 
(1) to atheism thus emerges unscathed. In addition, according to Rowe 
even Alston does not show (by his own admission) that we cannot be 
justified in believing that no good we know of would justify God's permit-
ting certain evils because Alston appeals to goods beyond our ken. So 
Alston has not shown that (1) is unjustifiable. 
Chapters Twelve, Thirteen, Fifteen and Sixteen offer some final theistic 
responses. Chapter Twelve provides us with van Inwagen's "Reflections on 
the Chapters by Draper, Russell, and Gale". In responding to Draper, van 
Inwagen recasts the discussion of epistemic probability in terms of epis-
temic judgments about "objective" probabilities to reformulate the general 
epistemic principle that he invoked in defending theism; he then claims that 
he sees fl ••• nothing in 'The Skeptical Theist' to undermine either the gener-
al epistemic principle I have appealed to or my application of it" (p. 229). 
But he not only disputes Draper's handling of one of the examples from 
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which Draper gleaned some necessary conditions for a good defense but 
also defends his discussion of extraterrestrial life against Draper's criticisms. 
Similarly, he crisply maintains that " ... Russell seems simply to deny the 
conclusion of my argument [from note 11 in Chapter Eight] without any 
discussion of the argument" (p. 234). Finally, he vindicates his modal skep-
ticism from Gale's attacks by arguing that (a) it does not lead to a radical 
skepticism because his story is not improbable on what we know (unlike 
Cartesian-type hypotheses that are improbable given what we know) (b) he 
applies his skepticism fairly to arguments for and against theism, and (c) his 
skepticism does not rule out all modal judgments as unjustified. 
Chapter Thirteen ("On Being Evidentially Challenged") contains 
Plantinga's riposte to Draper's explanatory argument. Plantinga argues 
that even if (HI) is a relevant alternative to theism, it is not clear that the 
antecedent probability that the world would contain such patterns of pain 
and pleasure is much lower on theism than (HI). He also maintains that 
because such arguments are relative to a given epistemic situation, in his 
situation he is free to assess these hypotheses in light of his belief in eter-
nal life and what this belief tells us about pain-and-pleasure patterns. 
Because theism is more probable if there is eternal life, Draper's argument 
loses its force. Finally, Plantinga contends that appeal to such beliefs is 
not dialectically deficient if one has flOnpropositional support for theism. 
In the fifteenth chapter, Daniel Howard-Snyder ("The Argument from 
Inscrutable Evil") maintains that evidential arguments from evil may be 
rare cases where one must be justified in a higher-level belief (e.g., that 
the inference from inscrutable evil to atheism is justified) to infer justifi-
ably that God does not exist. To foreclose any future arguments that 
would try to show that this inference is justified, he argues for the fol-
lowing epistemic principle: 
We CIlnnot see an x justifies believing there is 110 x only if we have no 
good reason to be in doubt about whether we would very likely to 
see x, if there were one (p. 299). 
Regarding inscrutable evil, then, he argues that we do have reason to be in 
doubt about the likelihood that we could discern the goods in question 
because (i) given humanity's progressive knowledge it would not be sur-
prising if there were more goods for us to uncover and (ii) it would not be 
surprising if the goods that would justify God in allowing certain evils 
were too complex for us to grasp. After defending these arguments 
against some objections, Howard-Snyder nevertheless claims that the argu-
ment from divine silence (why doesn't God, like a good parent, comfort 
those who experience such severe suffering?), if successful, would help to 
establish the justifiability of the atheistic inference from inscrutable evil. 
In Chapter Sixteen William Alston draws the theistic rejoinders and the 
volume to a close with "Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential 
Arguments from Evil". After disputing the probability assignments in 
Rowe's revised Bayesian argument, Alston returns to Rowe's first formula-
tion to contend that the inference is unjustified. It is unjustified for the 
same reason that, say, a neophyte's inference that there is no reason for a 
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master chess player's particular move from the fact that she sees no reason 
for this move is unjustified. For the amateur should expect that the 
expert's judgment would far outstrip her own. But such a situation does 
not impose what would, on Alstonian grounds, amount to an inadmissible 
higher-level requirement for the belief to be justified. For according to 
Alston, "[w]hat it takes for me to be in a position to make that inference is 
that there are, in the larger community, with which I am potentially in 
effective contact, persons who have sufficient reason to think that what we 
can discern of justifying reasons is an adequate guide to what justifying 
reasons God has available to Him" (p. 327). Because no finite human can 
have such a sufficient reason, no one is justified in making this inference. 
Finally, he argues that Draper's argument is not explanatory: at best it is an 
argument about epistemic probability because the hypotheses that Draper 
compares do not explain anything (in any intelligible sense of the term). 
We can now see why the third and fourth chapters are somewhat peculiar 
in the broad scope of this volume. In Chapter Three ("Some Major Strands 
of Theodicy") Richard Swinburne does not attempt to show that the evils of 
the world could, for all we know, serve a greater good; rather, he tries to dis-
play how they actually do contribute to greater goods. Complaining that 
much of the discussion of evil centers too narrowly on pleasure and pain, he 
argues that there are many actual goods (e.g., the having and satisfaction of 
desires, having compassionate desires, having significant free choice, and so 
on) the realization of which require evil. Unfortunately, although some 
opponents suppose that Swinburne's stance is more consistent than "skepti-
cal theists" (Draper, p.l88), none of them discuss his suggestions. 
In "Aquinas on the Sufferings of Job'" (Chapter Four), Eleonore Stump 
shows that Aquinas (in contrast with most other theistic views in this volume) 
held that we can ascertain the goods the sufferer will attain by enduring pain: 
specifically, God allows suffering as a kind of remedy for the disease of 
human sinfulness. (Bringing the metaphor up-to-date, Stump compares suf-
fering to a type of chemotherapy designed to eradicate the cancer of sin.) 
Those who persevere can more fully fulfill their human nature and enjoy con-
templating God. Learning about Aquinas's tack is beneficial according to 
Stump because it reveals not only how discussions of evil depend on broader 
issues, but also how some assumptions about these issues that we uncritically 
take for granted have not been universally embraced. 
Unfortunately, I have only provided the barest outline of these essays. 
Many rich and subtle topics cry out for comment. Here I want briefly to 
reflect on skepticism and the epistemology of modalities. Both sides 
seem to have more work to do on such topics. For instance, some on the 
atheistic side are too quick to accuse the theists of either being inconsis-
tent in their skeptical stances or imposing justificatory standards that 
lead to a radical skepticism in defending theism. Let me illustrate this 
attitude with a summary remark from Draper: 'The skeptical theist is 
trying to walk a tightrope-to use skepticism to defend a position that 
seems to many to be a paradigm case of something that one should be 
skeptical about" (p. 188). But surely it is only to the atheist or agnostic 
that theism is a paradigm case of what one should be skeptical about; a 
paradigm case acceptable to all would be some proposition along the 
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following lines: there were an even number of stars in the universe on 
July 4, 1976 at twelve noon, Eastern Daylight Savings Time. 
But "skeptical theists" have not answered all nagging questions. This is 
evident in even the most explicit statement of "modal skepticisml!-van 
Inwagen's: "If the subject matter of p is remote from the concerns of every-
day life, then our ordinary powers of 'modalization' are not reliable guides 
to the modal status of pI! (p. 237). This principle is not entirely helpful 
because van Inwagen himself so easily generates a counterexample: "We 
certainly know the modal status of 'If God exists, then there is an immateri-
al being' and the 'subject matter' of this proposition is, no doubt, remote 
from the concerns of everyday life" (p. 237). So one is still left wondering 
which modal judgments "removed from everyday life" are justified and 
which ones aren't. Now I am not suggesting that no Chisholming can save 
this formulation; nor did I intimate that the atheist cannot show that the 
standards employed by theists lead to an objectionable version of skepti-
cism. I am simply pointing to an area that deserves further philosophical 
exploration, as do many of the other topics broached in this volume. 
In many ways, this collection portrays philosophy at its best (though the 
exchange between van Inwagen and Gale is a bit acrimonious); it shows 
philosophers from differing perspectives coming together to make progress 
on a specific issue. A pleasant benefit is that this volume, unlike many other 
anthologies, for the most part has the feel of a genuine philosophical conver-
sation. In the course of this conversation, members from both camps gra-
ciously concede that their previous formulations need various repairs and 
they attempt to reformulate them to avoid these defects. Perhaps most 
importantly, this conversation features some of the most important ,"Titers 
in the field offering new perspectives and arguments. Although I am not a 
prophet, I suspect that some of these new arguments will soon become a ref-
erence point for many debates on evil and the existence of God. For putting 
such a resource at our fingertips, we are all indebted to the authors whose 
work is collected here and especially the" collector" himself: Daniel Howard-
Snyder.2 
NOTES 
1. Stump's reprinted essay brings the total of reprinted articles to six 
(not five-oops!-as the cover states). 
2. I wish to thank Daniel Howard-Snyder and Philip L. Quinn for some 
comments on previous drafts of this review. Any errors that remain are, of 
course, my responsibility and from them one may conclusively infer that I 
am neither omniscient, omnipotent nor omnibenevolent. 
The Concept of Faith: A Philosophical Investigation, by William Lad 
Sessions. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994. 298 pp. 
GEORGE MAVRODES, University of Michigan 
This book is an unusually provocative and suggestive contribution to the 
recent literature in the philosophy of religion. It undertakes to explore the 
